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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KIRK VAUGHAN KELSEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050033-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-102.5 (West 2004). 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Is the probative value of defendant's threats to kill the assault victim and to 
sexually assault and kill a witness substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury? 
The decision to admit evidence under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1227 (Utah 1989). See also State 
v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1996). Because the decision to admit or 
exclude evidence under rule 403 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, "[the 
reviewing] court will only conclude the trial court abused its discretion if the ruling 'was 
beyond the limits of reasombility.'"Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1271 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (West 2004): 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. .. . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004): 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily 
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-102.5 (West 2004). R5-6. 
Conviction. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R308. 
2 
Sentence. The trial court imposed the indeterminate statutory term of zero to five 
years. R320. 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R333. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On 24 March 2004, defendant and Tyler Murdock were prisoners in the Cache County 
jail. TT: 100. When a deputy opened defendant's cell to talk about some screaming he had 
heard over the jail intercom system, defendant stepped out, turned to his left, called Murdock 
a "punk ass jail bitch," and punched him in the right cheek. TT: 131; see TT: 113, 130. 
* * * 
Earlier in the day, as Deputy Stewart made his rounds through cell block A, defendant 
complained that his toilet was not working properly. TT:100, 127. Defendant also called 
into the control room through the intercom system in his cell and told Deputy Toon about the 
problem. TT:100. When Deputy Stewart returned to the control room, Deputy Toon 
reported that he had turned the water on and off in an attempt to fix defendant's toilet. 
TT:100, 127. Deputy Stewart noticed that the intercom was still turned on in defendant's 
cell. TT: 127. The two deputies then heard loud yelling and screaming through the intercom. 
TT:100, 128. Deputy Stewart heard someone saying that he was drowning. TT:128. 
]The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92. Because the transcript volumes are 
unnumbered, they are cited as follows: Trial Transcript (TT: ); Motion Hearing 
Transcript (MHT: ). 
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"You punk ass jail bitch " 
Deputy Stewart went back to cell block A to investigate. TT:100, 128. He found 
Murdock sitting on a water storage device in the hallway of cell block A watching television. 
TT:110, 112, 129, 147. Defendant was using his toilet. TT:128, 148. Deputy Stewart told 
the inmates that they "weren't behaving like decent grown adults." TT: 128. He then asked 
who was yelling and screaming. Id. When no one responded, Deputy Stewart informed 
defendant that when he was finished using the toilet, he was going to take defendant up front 
to talk about who was screaming. Id. Deputy Stewart "knew that if [defendant] wasn't the 
one screaming he knew who was screaming, because his cell was the only cell [with the 
intercom turned on]." TT: 149. Deputy Stewart walked to the back of the cell block to give 
defendant some privacy and to ask the other inmates about the screaming. TT: 112,130,148. 
When Deputy Stewart returned to defendant's cell, he asked Deputy Toon, who was 
monitoring the video feed of cell block A in the control room, to open the cell door. TT: 101, 
130. As the door slid open, defendant stepped out, turned to his left, called Murdock a 
"punch ass jail bitch," and punched Murdock in the right cheek. TT:131; see TT:113, 130. 
The attack left Murdock with a reddish bruise on his right cheek. TT132, 161; see also 
State's Exh.## 2-3. 
"He told me that he was going to shank my ass,. . . kill Mr. Murdock, " 
and "that he was going to have anal sex with me until I died" 
After defendant punched Murdock, Deputy Stewart stepped between them. TT: 134-
135. He told defendant to turn around and put his hands behind his back. TT:135. At first 
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defendant refused, but he eventually complied. Id. Deputy Stewart then called the control 
room to open the door to cell block A and for backup. Id. Once Deputy Stewart and 
defendant were out of cell block A, Deputy Stewart told defendant to start walking toward 
booking. Id. Defendant told Deputy Stewart that he was going to "shank [Deputy Stewart's] 
ass." TT: 136. Defendant also said that he was going to kill Murdock, that he knew where 
Deputy Stewart lived, and that he was "going to have anal sex with [Deputy Stewart] until 
[Deputy Stewart] died." Id. Defendant made these threats about fifteen seconds after 
assaulting Murdock. TT: 160. 
Defendant threatened "to cut up Mr. Murdock. . . into little pieces" 
When Deputy Stewart and defendant arrived at booking, defendant was placed in a 
holding cell. TT:138. Defendant was "very aggressive." Id. He pounded on the door and 
continued his threats against Deputy Stewart and Murdock. Id. Defendant said he was going 
to "cut up Mr. Murdock on [Deputy Stewart's] front lawn into little pieces," and reiterated 
his threat to have anal sex with Deputy Stewart until he died. TT: 136, 138. Defendant also 
"stuffed his clothing into the toilet, which plugged it, and began flushing it continuously, 
which... overflowed the holding cell." TT: 13 8. Officers covered the window of the holding 
cell because defendant would "instantly become enraged and mad" whenever he saw Deputy 
Stewart. TT:139. 
After defendant was placed in the holding cell, Deputy Stewart went back to cell block 
A and brought Murdock to booking. TT: 173. Deputy Anderson interviewed Murdock. Id. 
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Although Murdock admitted that defendant had struck him, Murdock did not want to press 
charges or cooperate with the investigation. TT: 173-174. However, he did tell Deputy 
Anderson that he was the one who had been screaming, not defendant. Id. Murdock had not 
confessed to the screaming earlier because he did not like defendant. TT: 174. 
At trial, Murdock was called as a witness by defendant. TT:192. According to 
Murdock, he always had red cheeks related to acne, defendant's fingers merely "touch[ed]" 
or "rubbed55 his right cheek, and he felt no pain. TT: 194-195, 200. On cross-examination, 
Murdock acknowledged that he feared being labeled a snitch. TT:202; see also TT:200. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's post-assault threats to kill 
Murdock and to sexually assault and kill Deputy Stewart. The threat evidence was relevant 
and highly probative of defendant's disputed intent to seriously injure Murdock when he 
assaulted him moments earlier. Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible unless it has 
an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury. Defendant's 
threats—though crude and outrageous—were not so unfairly prejudicial as to reverse the 
presumption favoring admissibility. Further, the probative value of the threat evidence was 
not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. First, evidence the threats were made 
within minutes—if not seconds—of the assault was strong and shed critical light on 
defendant's intent to injure Murdock. Second, the State's need for the threat evidence was 
high, given that the physical evidence was minimal, and that the reluctant victim ultimately 
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testified on behalf of defendant and sought to minimize defendant's conduct. Finally, the 
danger that evidence of defendant's threats would unfairly prejudice the jury was relatively 
minor. The trial court's admissibility ruling should thus be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S THREATS TO KILL 
MURDOCK AND TO SEXUALLY ASSAULT AND KILL DEPUTY 
STEWART IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE 
DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE, CONFUSION OF THE ISSUE, OR 
MISLEADING THE JURY 
Defendant challenges the admission of evidence that he threatened Murdock and 
Deputy Stewart following his assault on Murdock. Defendant grudgingly acknowledges that 
his post-assault threats have some relevance, but asserts that the probative value of evidence 
that he threatened Murdock and Deputy Stewart was outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice and thus should have been excluded under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. 
Br. at 8, 10. Because defendant's threats were highly probative of his disputed intent, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence. 
Proceedings below. Before trial, defendant moved under rule 403 to exclude the 
threats he made against Deputy Stewart immediately after assaulting Murdock. Rl 10-12. 
During oral argument, defense counsel further moved to exclude defendant's post-assault 
threats against Murdock.2 See MHT:29. The trial court denied defendant's motion, ruling 
2Defendant did not include in his written motion in limine the threats against 
Murdock because they were not included in Deputy Stewart's report. See MHT:29. 
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that the threats against both Deputy Stewart and Murdock were probative of defendant's 
intent: 
Threats to Tyler Murdock, to start with, it strikes me are remarkably 
probative. Remarkably. Certainly they're prejudicial against [defendant]. 
They wouldn't be offered if they weren't. That's why they are used because 
they're prejudicial. 
They are remarkably probative as to whether or not the assault occurred 
and the mens rea, if you will, of the defendant at the time. Threats to the 
officer may well relate to the same exact thing. If your client is in a mind set 
of outrage and threatening and hostile, that kind of mind set is demonstrative 
to the jury as to what may have been the situation a few minutes earlier when 
the alleged assault occurred. 
MHT:31; see also TT:182 (reiterating earlier ruling) (copies of the trial court's oral rulings 
are attached in the addendum). 
At trial, Deputies Anderson, Stewart, and Toon testified regarding defendant's post-
assault threats. SeeTT: 102-03,136-38,172. Approximately fifteen seconds after assaulting 
Murdock, defendant threatened to "shank [Deputy Stewart's] ass," kill Murdock, and to 
"have anal sex with [Deputy Stewart] until [Deputy Stewart] died." TT:136, 160. When 
defendant arrived in booking, he threatened to cut Murdock up into "little pieces" on Deputy 
Stewart's front yard. TT:136. 
Defense counsel objected to the post-assault threats throughout the trial. See TT:135, 
138-139, 182. The trial court denied the objections, based on its pretrial ruling. Id. 
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A. Defendant does not and could not assert that the threat evidence 
was so prejudicial as to reverse the presumption in favor of its 
admissibility. 
Under rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. Because 
"[i]n a broad sense, almost all evidence is [prejudicial]," the fact that evidence is prejudicial 
does not automatically render it inadmissible. Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 
109, f 28, 992 P.2d 969. Indeed, "[i]f [r]ule 403 simply prohibited prejudicial evidence, 
hardly any evidence would be admissible." Id. Thus, the rule only bars detrimental evidence 
which may create an unfair prejudice against defendant. Id.; see also State v. Kooyman, 2005 
UT App 222, \ 26, 112 P.3d 1252 ("[Ejvidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it 
is detrimental to a party's case.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
Accordingly, under rule 403, relevant evidence is presumed admissible unless it "'has 
an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury.5" State v. Jaeger, 
1999 UT 1, If 18, 973 P.2d 404 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993) 
(additional citations omitted)). The presumption is reversed in favor of inadmissibility only 
for evidence that is "'uniquely subject to being used to distort the deliberative process and 
skew a trial's outcome.'" Dunn, 850 P.2d atl222 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 
1229 (Utah 1989)). The Utah Supreme Court has identified only three categories of evidence 
that are so prejudicial as to reverse the presumption. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
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1256-57 (Utah 1988); State v. White, 880 P.2d 18,21 (Utah App. 1994). The three categories 
are (1) gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse; (2) a rape victim's past sexual 
activities with someone other than the accused; and (3) statistical evidence of matters not 
susceptible to quantitative analysis, such as witness veracity. See White, 880 P.2d at 21. 
Here, defendant's threats to injure and kill Murdock and to sexually assault and kill 
Deputy Stewart, see TT: 102-103,136-38,172, do not fall into one of the three categories of 
presumptively prejudicial evidence. The threats are not gruesome, nor are they statistical 
evidence incapable of quantitative analysis. See White, 880 P.2d at 21. Although defendant 
did threaten to sexually assault Deputy Stewart until the deputy died, that threat is not 
presumptively prejudicial because it does not go to a rape victim's pas sexual activities with 
someone other than the accused. Id. Thus, evidence of defendant's threats is presumed 
admissible unless defendant can show that the relevance of the threat evidence "is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
B. Defendant has not and cannot show that the probative value 
of his threats was substantially outweighed by their potential 
for unfair prejudice. 
Defendant has not and cannot make this showing here. The trial court acted within 
its discretion in determining that defendant's threats—made immediately after the assault on 
Murdock—were highly probative of defendant's intent and that the probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. See MHT:31; TT: 182. 
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In determining the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence challenged under 
rule 403, several factors are considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, 
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, 
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
State v. Decor so, 1999 UT 57, Tf 29, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 
295-296 (Utah 1988) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §190, at 565 (3d ed. 
1984))). 
Applying these factors here, the trial court's admissibility ruling is well-supported. 
The threat evidence was highly probative of defendant's intent while the risk of unfair 
prejudice was low. Id. First, evidence that defendant made the threats was strong—three 
different deputies heard defendant's threats and recounted them at trial. See, e.g., TT:103, 
118, 136-137, 160, 172. Second, defendant's threats—made moments after he assaulted 
Murdock—show his angry state of mind and intent to seriously injure Murdock, if not 
Deputy Stewart. Id. Third, the need for the threat evidence was "very high." DeCorso, 1999 
UT 57, Tf 33. Indeed, to prove defendant guilty of assault by a prisoner, the State was 
required to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant intended to cause bodily injury 
when he assaulted Murdock, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004), which element 
defendant disputed through Murdock's testimony. See TT:97-98, 216; see also Aplt. Br. at 
13 ("The victim testified that the Defendant did not hit him and that his fingers rubbed across 
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his face.55). The threat evidence was thus highly probative and admissible to establish 
defendant's intent, a relevant non-character purpose under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which authorizes admission of "other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.55 Given his disputed intent, defendant does not—and could not successfully—assert 
that admission of his threats violated rule 404(b). 
Further, the State's need for the threat evidence was high not only because intent was 
a pivotal trial issue, but because "the efficacy of alternative proof was very low.55 Decor so, 
1999 UT 57, Tf 33. Murdock was a reluctant victim who ultimately testified in defendant's 
behalf, minimizing defendant's conduct. See, e.g., TT: 194-195, 200, 202. Moreover, the 
physical evidence of bruising was minimal and was as arguably consistent with an intent to 
injure as not. See, e.g., TT:132, 161, 176, 194-195, 200, 202; see also State's Exh.## 2-3. 
Accordingly, the threat evidence was highly probative of defendant's intent to injure 
Murdock, but was not cumulative. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^ 33. The State's case against 
defendant would succeed or fail based entirely on whether the jury accepted the three 
deputies' credibility regarding the fact of the assault itself and defendant5 s subsequent violent 
threats. Thus, given the probative value of the threat evidence—and its necessity to the 
State's case—the trial court correctly determined that the resulting prejudice was not unfair. 
MHT:31;TT:182. 
12 
Finally, "the degree to which the threat evidence was likely to unfairly prejudice the 
jury was relatively minor." Decor so, 1999 UT 57, j^ 34. Because he was immediately 
restrained, defendant was unable to carry out his threats against either Murdock or Deputy 
Stewart. Therefore, although the threats were crude and likely made in order to provoke or 
outrage Murdock and Deputy Stewart, they were not likely to inflame the jury or incite 
overmastering hostility toward defendant. See State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822,825 (Utah App. 
1991) (holding Jaimez failed to show that probative value of his crude and outrageous 
comments—that Officer Cowan had been cuckolded by defendant and that defendant had 
fathered Mrs. Cowan's children—was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice). 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant relies on State v. Maurer, 11Q P.2d 981 (Utah 
1989), to argue that his threats were improperly admitted. See Aplt. Br. at 8-12. In Maurer, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a letter written by Maurer to the murder victim's father 
over a month after the murder was more prejudicial than probative and should have been 
excluded from trial. Maurer, 110 P.2d at 983. Specifically, the court held that the majority 
of Mauer's letter reflected his state of mind—not at the time of the murder—but at the time 
he wrote the letter. Id. Therefore, Mauer's post-murder letter had very little relevance to the 
pivotal issue at trial—his intent at the time he committed the murder. Id. Moreover, Mauer's 
letter "displayed] his callousness toward the killing which he expresse[d] in profane and 
vulgar language and manifested] his complete insensitivity to th[e] tragedy." A/. "The letter 
taunt[ed] the victim's father and was designed to inflict guilt upon him and add to the grief 
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he must have then been feeling." Id. Thus, the minimal probative value of Mauer's letter, 
coupled with its highly inflammatory language, required that it be excluded under rule 403. 
The Maurer court held, however, that a portion of the letter reflecting Maurer's state of mind 
at the time of the murder was relevant and admissible. Id. That portion read: "'It was a great 
feeling to watch her die. She kept crying "It hurts, It hurts." I should hope so, I mean it was 
a 13 inch kitchen knife. Mike Bickley got to watch her die too. It was great.'" Id. at 982. 
Defendant's threats to further harm and kill Murdock and to sexually assault and kill 
Deputy Stewart are distinguishable from Mauer, primarily because they were made within 
minutes—if not seconds—of the assault on Murdock. They were thus highly probative of 
defendant's disputed intent during the assault. As set forth above, Mauer's vituperative letter 
was written over one month after the murder and thus shed little probative light on his 
feelings at the time he actually committed the murder. Further, defendant's unrealized 
threats here were far less likely to inflame the jury or incite overmastering hostility toward 
defendant than was the admissible portion of Mauer's letter—describing Mauer's elation in 
watching his victim succumb to the fatal knife attack. 
Given the broad discretion of the trial court in deciding issues of admissibility under 
rule 403, and the fact that defendant's threats were highly probative of his intent when he 
committed the assault moments earlier, the trial court's admission of the threat evidence was 
not unreasonable. Evidence is clearly admissible when, as here, it is at least equally 
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probative of genuine issues as it is prejudicial. See State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141 
(Utah 1989). The trial court's sound admissibility ruling should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury conviction for assault by a prisoner should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
|^ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON ^ ' September 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum 
Page 1 
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1 things, Your Honor. Alleged threats to the officer, which 
2 are in the report. And alleged threats to Tyler Murdock, 
3 which donft appear in the report. Both are as he!s being led 
4 away down the hallway after, well after, the altercation. 
5 THE COURT: Threats to Tyler Murdock, to start with, 
6 it strikes me are remarkably probative. Remarkably. 
7 Certainly they're prejudicial against your client. They 
8 wouldn't be offered if they weren't. That's why they are 
9 I used because they're prejudicial. 
10 They are remarkably probative as to whether or not the 
11 assault occurred and the mens re, if you will, of the 
12 defendant at the time. Threats to the officer may well 
13 relate to the same exact thing. If your client is in a mind 
14 set of outrage and threatening and hostile, that kind of mind 
15 set is demonstrative to the jury as to what may have been the 
16 situation a few minutes earlier when the alleged assault 
17 occurred. 
18 After reading your memorandum and that of the state, I'm 
19 prepared to deny your motion. 
20 MR. BUNDERSON: I suppose I could bring that up 
21 again at the trial depending on --
22 THE COURT: Yeah, depending on what the 
23 circumstances are. I have some idea what the officer will 
24 
25 
testify about, as do you. You've had an opportunity to 
conduct some discovery relative to those nonreported 
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1 the record that you can think of that we've said off the 
2 record that should be made part of the record? 
3 MR. BUNDERSON: I still have that continuing 
4 objection to the post-event statements? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. And I made a ruling on that. I 
6 offered you the opportunity to give the basis for it. You 
7 wisely said no. The reason for that is because one of the 
8 elements of this offense is mental state. His mental state 
9 can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. The fact 
10 that he was upset and said things are circumstances that 
11 suggest what his mental state was at the time of and shortly 
12 after the incident occurred. That's why I allowed them in. 
13 I think they are evidence of what his mental state was both 
14 at the time of the offense by the statements he made at that 
15 point; and thereafter by the fact that he was angry and the 
16 I statements made. I think that goes to his mental state. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. BUNDERSON: I made objections in front of the 
jury to Officer Stewart testifying to both of those things. 
I did not object when Officer Anderson testified to those 
things. 
THE COURT: I understand why. Because you'd already 
exhausted that. I don!t think you had to again in front of 
the jury. The same ruling would have been made. 
MR. BUNDERSON: As long as the court feels I have a 
standing objection. 
